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PRECEDENT IN THE FEDERAL COURTS OF APPEALS:
AN ENDANGERED OR INVASIVE SPECIES?*
John B. Oakley**
Our panel's topic is optimizing the law-declaring function,
and within its purview is the status of precedent in modem
courts of appeal. I take "precedent" to refer to appellate opinions
that confront and resolve a perceived gap in the law by the
declaration of law that is in some sense novel. I am not
concerned today with whether this is making law in some
frankly legislative sense or merely declaring law by
extrapolation in a more interpretive sense. Sometimes courts
confront a novel case, and by deciding it for reasons stated
create a precedent for how similar cases should be decided in the
future. This is generally thought to be a good thing, by reducing
uncertainty about the law and thus encouraging orderly social
behavior: We expect extrajudicial behavior to be more
predictable when people can make choices in reliance on
relatively determinate judicial enforcement of previously
declared rules of law.
The system of precedent works to such good ends only
when ostensible precedents are in fact followed in later cases.
Two conditions contribute interdependently to the success of
precedent in clarifying the law and organizing predictable
behavior in accordance with law. First, courts empowered to
make precedent must discharge that function wisely, by writing
opinions that are good examples of the judicial craft: They must
produce public declarations of law that are well reasoned and
persuasively grounded both in prior law and in present
circumstances, whose novelty is carefully described and
* This essay was originally prepared for the author's presentation as part of a panel at the
2005 National Conference on Appellate Justice entitled "Optimizing the Law-Declaring
Function."
** Professor of Law, University of California at Davis.
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adequately explained. Second, there must be general judicial
commitment to stare decisis, so that courts will habitually accept
that the existence of a precedent is reason alone for its
application to a later case, even if they might decide that case
differently were it a case of first impression. Obviously, the
more persuasive the articulation of an opinion proferred as
precedent, the more likely a later court will be to accord it
binding effect-unless, of course, the later court has no choice.
I'll say more in due course about different degrees and
dimensions of stare decisis. But first, you have been asked to
consider, and I have been asked to address, whether precedent is
an endangered species in the decisionmaking of modem
appellate courts.
Much of the concern about the current status of precedent,
particularly within the federal courts of appeal, is secondary to a
phenomenon over which judges have virtually no control: a
"crisis of volume" that is decades long and remains unabated,
which has caused caseloads per judge to rise to levels once
thought unimaginable. In order to keep the judicial enterprise
from grinding to a halt, judges have had to make painful
compromises in how cases are decided. The rationing of scarce
judicial time requires heavy reliance on staff assistance to
manage a tracking system in which most cases proceed to
disposition without oral argument, without a full-dress opinion,
or without either. This frees judicial time for more extensive and
personal judicial involvement in a relatively small subset of
cases-those orally argued-and especially in an even smaller
subset of these argued cases-those decided by a published
opinion.1 When a case is decided by published opinion, it
generally means that the deciding panel intends the case to serve
as a precedent.
If the institution of precedent is endangered in the federal
courts of appeals, it must be because there are too few
precedents being published, or because these courts have
become too lax in following precedent. I find little support for
1. Even with a publication rate that as of last year had fallen to nineteen percent of all
merits terminations, there were over 5,000 opinions published last year by the federal
courts of appeals. Federal Judicial Center, 1955-2005 Statistical Data Regarding Federal
Courts, 8 J. App. Prac. & Process, 21, 32 chart 4 (2006) ("Changing Procedures in the
United States Courts of Appeals") [hereinafter FederalCourts StatisticalData].
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either proposition. Five thousand new published opinions a year
does not seem to indicate a drought of precedent to be applied.
Nor is it apparent that precedent today is more casually treated
than in years past. Indeed, the trend is to the contrary, at least
superficially. Vertical stare decisis demands, today as in the
past, that lower courts give binding effect to the applicable
precedents of higher courts. District courts unproblematically
follow circuit law; circuit courts likewise follow the precedents
of the Supreme Court. Horizontal stare decisis does not apply
between circuits, and never has. Indeed the Supreme Court
appears to encourage circuit splits by the parsimonious exercise
of its certiorari jurisdiction. But there has been pronounced
change in the intra-circuit application of horizontal stare decisis.
Virtually every circuit treats a published panel position as the
law of the circuit, demanding that other panels follow it, and
permitting a change in circuit law only by the cumbersome
process of rehearing en banc.
It may be useful to put into perspective just how radically
conditions have changed since the heyday of precedent in the
federal appellate courts. I think we have to go back not thirty
years to find that heyday, for in 1975 the crisis of volume was
already mounting. Let's go back another thirty years, to roughly
1945, an era described in Marvin Schick's classic volume,
Learned Hand's Court.2 There we find the six judges of the
Second Circuit deciding roughly 125 cases per judge per year, in
panels of three. Some cases were decided per curiam or by
summary disposition, so that each judge participated in about
105 full-dress panel opinions per year, and was thus responsible
for writing the lead opinion in about thirty-five such cases.
Moreover, the judges sat together, not only in the sense that they
spent most of their time in the same building, but also in the
sense that with twenty different possible combinations of threejudge panels drawn from the six sitting judges, there was only a
five percent chance that a case decided by a panel of judges A,
B, and C would be argued as a precedent before the entirely
distinct panel of judges D, E, and F.
I invoke this era as the heyday of precedent because judges
had time to think cases through without a great deal of self2. Marvin Schick, Learned Hand's Court (Johns Hopkins U. Press 1970).
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conscious or staff-delegated decisionmaking about whether a
given case was important enough, or likely enough, to give rise

to a new precedent, and hence to justify close judicial attention.
Likely precedents would emerge at the end of the
decisionmaking process, not at the beginning. There was no
express rule of intra-circuit, horizontal stare decisis. Precedents
were the end-product of a collegial process. Despite occasional
sharp differences among judges, panel opinions generally
reflected the shared thought and values of the entire court, and
not just the views of the judges on the decision panel. Precedents
were followed by other judges of the same court more out of
conviction than compulsion.
Today only the First Circuit is a six-judge court, and in
2004 it had 287 filings per judge-up from fifty-one in 1955, the
closest data point we have to the conditions of the Learned Hand
era. 3 Every other circuit now has eleven or more judgeships, and
except for the D.C. Circuit and the Tenth Circuit, their caseloads
per judge match or exceed that of the First Circuit.4 The Second,
Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits exceed 500 filings per year per
judge.5 And the judges of most circuits maintain chambers
dispersed in multiple cities and states within the circuits. More
than ever, panels typically work in isolation from the court as a
whole.
It is interesting that as caseloads have risen by a factor of
ten or more, the rate of reversal of the court below in appeals
decided by the federal courts of appeals has fallen sharply, from
not quite twenty-eight percent in 1955 to eighteen percent in
1975 and roughly ten percent in 2005. 6 For me this is a matter
of concern, because district court caseloads per judge have also
risen substantially, if not as dramatically as caseloads per judge
among the courts of appeals. 7 I see no reason to think that this
has led to a lower rate of erroneous decisions than used to be the
case. And this leads me to question whether modem federal
3. Federal Courts Statistical Data, supra n. 1, at 26 chart 2A (2006) ("Filings Per
Appellate Judgeship, by Circuit").
4. 1d.
5. Id.
6. Federal Courts StatisticalData, supra n. 1, at 32 chart 4 ("Changing Procedures in
the United States Courts of Appeals").
7. Id. at 25 chart 2 ("Filings Overall and Per Judgeship in U.S. District Courts and
Regional Courts of Appeals").
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courts of appeals have become so concerned with preserving

their precedent-making function that they are neglecting their
error-correction function.
The federal courts are, of course, intermediate courts of
appeal, exercising a largely mandatory function of reviewing
judgments and other final orders as a matter of right. I fear that
their tracking and screening systems have instituted what is, in
effect, a gloss of discretionary appellate jurisdiction for the
appeal as of right to which federal litigants are statutorily
entitled. The mine run of cases don't make the cut; these cases
are decided by expedited means that discourage reversal. This
may be socially efficient, but it is not without moral cost if
indeed caseload pressures are leaving too many needlesome
cases undiscovered in the fast-track haystack.

I have no answer to the legitimate question of how many is
too many. We cannot expect perfection of any human system.
But surely there is cause for concern when reversal rates drop so
sharply. And the way we should address this concern is not at
the level of individual cases, whose outcomes we cannot
individually second-guess. But it seems fair, even imperative,
that we reconsider whether the present norms of internal federal
appellate decisionmaking procedures have struck the right
balance between the somewhat self-glorifying task of creating
precedents and the more mundane task of reviewing and
correcting the application of established law by the courts
below. Precedent is not an endangered species, in my opinion.
Has it become an invasive one?
I mean to do more than murmur "tut-tut." There is one
feature of the modern practice of precedent in the federal

appellate courts that I'm going to nominate as eligible for
reform. I'm now going to cast myself as a contrarian, inviting

reconsideration of that relatively modern judicial phenomenon I
have identified as intra-circuit, horizontal stare decisis. This is
not, I hasten to remind you, a law of nature. Indeed, I will show
you that it is not even plausibly a minimum condition for the
functional operation of a modern, high-volume, intermediate
court of appeal. It is largely a product of the past thirty years'
mounting caseloads.
Let me return briefly to the two conditions I posited earlier
for the efficacy of a system of judicial precedent. It requires
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good opinions, opinions that are specific, articulate, and
persuasive, and it requires that they generally be given binding
effect. Mushy opinions permit distinction, sapping their value as
precedent. Peremptory opinions that fail fully to develop a
rationale for decision invite such distinction. Modem appellate
courts, charged with deciding too many cases in too little time,
have responded by producing arguably over-written opinions in
cases deemed to be precedent making. And the supplanting of a
collegial culture of deference to precedent with strict rules of
horizontal stare decisis has arguably encouraged competition
among panels to be the first to address some perceived novel
issue, thus winning the high ground of circuit-binding precedent
by imposing a contestable view of the law on the rest of the
circuit. Screening systems suppress reevaluation by fast-tracking
later like cases-indeed, this is what makes strict rules of the
law of the circuit appealing as an efficiency device. But even
when a later panel not only encounters but identifies a putatively
binding precedent that it regards as unsound, there are
substantial disincentives to devoting scarce judicial time to an
overt challenge to the arguably mistaken precedent in the thin
hope of provoking a rehearing en banc. There are also
substantial incentives to distinguish the ostensible precedent on
shaky if not candidly spurious grounds, and, because such
distinction will largely turn on how the facts are characterized,
to bury this departure from or narrowing of precedent in the
nether world of cases decided by summary disposition or
unpublished opinion.
Now let us suppose a different regime of precedent. The
imperative of vertical stare decisis would remain unchanged, as
would the absence of horizontal stare decisis between circuits.
This would mean the district courts would have to follow a
panel opinion on point, except to the extent that a different panel
of its circuit issued a conflicting opinion, making district courts
efficient barometers of when en banc resolution of the law of the
circuit is needed. But suppose there were no intra-circuit,
horizontal stare decisis accorded to panel opinions as opposed to
en banc opinions? I doubt that in the current conditions of
intense caseload pressure this would spark the making of
mountains of controversy out of the molehills of most panel
decisions that at present count as circuit law. Deference would
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continue to be the dominant response, and by the accretion of
panel-by-panel reaffirmation of the point in question, a less
peremptory sort of circuit law would take firm root. On the other
hand, there would be a reduced incentive to rush to decide a
point of likely controversy within the circuit, or to over-write an
opinion in order to increase the scope of its binding effect.
Judges would still have good reason, however, to craft with care
an opinion likely to be cited as a precedent, because its lasting
effect would be contingent on its persuasiveness. But perhaps,
just perhaps, a reorientation of panel decisionmaking primarily
toward deciding cases for the panel, with circuit-wide effects left
to the independent decision of other panels in other cases, would
promote marginally more attention to the error-correction
function of an intermediate court of appeal.
There is in fact one large appellate system, the Courts of
Appeal of the State of California, that self-consciously operates
today without horizontal stare decisis. The Courts of Appeal are
divided into six districts, and most of these districts are further
divided into divisions. Many of the divisions have more than
three judges (or "justices" by California's nomenclature). Panels
of the California Courts of Appeal are free to depart not only
from decisions by other districts of the Courts of Appeal, but
even from decisions by other divisions within the same district,
or by different panels of the same division or undivided district.
I must say that I long regarded this lack of horizontal stare
decisis at the California Courts of Appeal as misguided. From
1997 to 2001 1 served on the California Appellate Process Task
Force, where, supported only by Professor Clark Kelso, 8 1 staged
a lonely and wholly unsuccessful campaign to persuade the Task
Force that horizontal stare decisis was fundamental to the
rational operation of any intermediate court of appeal. Let me
quote the responsive section from the Task Force's report:
There are critics of California's rejection of the horizontal
component of stare decisis who raise two primary
concerns. First, absent a doctrine of horizontal stare
decisis, it is possible for conflicts to arise between districts
and divisions that remain unresolved for many years
(because the California Supreme Court may not intervene
8. Professor Kelso, the Reporter for the Task Force, was the only other academic
participating in its work.
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to resolve the conflict). Conflicts create confusion and
disharmony in the law. Second, even absent clear conflicts,
the absence of horizontal stare decisis fosters an
undercurrent of uncertainty in the development of the law,
over-emphasizing for each three-judge appellate panel its
independence from other panels of the Courts of Appeal.
Critics note that California's approach to horizontal stare
decisis is unique among state courts.
These criticisms may, as a practical matter, be somewhat
exaggerated. The number of conflicts between published
Courts of Appeal opinions does not appear to be large, and
the Supreme Court appears to be taking up most conflicts
under its review jurisdiction. Moreover, conflicts permit an
issue to be fully vented in the Courts of Appeal before
being taken up by the Supreme Court. Thus, conflicts
between districts and divisions have both positive and
negative features.
As for the asserted undercurrent of uncertainty, although
one panel of the Courts of Appeal is technically not bound
to follow decisions from other panels, panels in practice
appear to respect the views of other panels and to reject
such views only for important reasons that are set forth in
the court's opinion. In other words, an informal version of
horizontal
stare decisis may operate in practice, if not in
9
theory.
The Task Force did decide that if horizontal stare decisis
were to be introduced at the California Courts of Appeal, on
either an intra-district or inter-district basis, it should be
accompanied by en banc procedures, which that court presently
lacks. Its reasoning is again illuminating:
If horizontal stare decisis were introduced, disagreements
between panels might not be expressed as readily in
published opinions, but the disagreements might persist
below the surface and affect decision-making and opinion
writing in subtle ways. The en banc procedure serves, in
part, as a safety valve for the expression of these differing
viewpoints. It permits difficult issues to be addressed by a
larger number of Courts of Appeal justices thereby
9. California Appellate Process Task Force, Report of the Appellate Process Task
Force 61, http://www.courtinfo.ca.gov/reference/documents/appellate.pdf (2000) (accessed
June 29, 2006; copy on file with Journal of Appellate Practice and Process).
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reflecting the collective wisdom
of a wider range of
0
experiences and viewpoints.'
I am happy to report that despite the rejection of my advice,
the California Courts of Appeal remain fully functional. There
are some important differences between them and the federal
courts of appeal that I cannot elaborate here, most significantly
the expressly discretionary jurisdiction that they have over some
types of cases. But these differences pale beside the similarities,
and so I must conclude that horizontal stare decisis within the
circuits of the federal courts of appeal is no more indispensable
than between the circuits, where it has never existed. It exists by
choice, not by necessity. I invite your consideration whether it
remains the right choice.

10. Id. at 62-63.

